

DANE

KILLER APP FOR DNSSEC?

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WHAT'S WRONG WITH PKI?

- You have no way of knowing which the “right one” CA is...
 - And they are all equally trusted...
 - And there are lots of them...
- Extended Validation (EV), Organization Validated (OV), Domain Validated (DV)
- Domain Validated (DV) certs based on email/whois information.

QUESTION FOR YOU:

DO YOU KNOW WHICH CA YOUR BANK USES?

DO YOU KNOW IF IT USES EV OR OV OR DV
CERTS?

DANE

- The domain owner should know!
- Put fingerprint (or cert) in DNS
- Sign it with DNSSEC
- (Add some magic dust)
- Use that as new “trust path” for certificate

DANE PROTOCOL

- DANE Use Cases and Requirements, RFC 6394, October 2011 (R. Barnes)
- DANE / TLSA Protocol, RFC6698, August 2012 (P. Hoffman, J. Schlyter)
- TLSA RR Type (TLS Association)
- *_port._proto.example IN TLSA usage selector matching data*
 - `_443._tcp.www.tlsa.cz. IN TLSA 3 0 1
2f4af1513d4457c0e97f7ebb14ea...`

CERTIFICATE USAGE

- Must pass the PKIX validation (Usage 0/1)
 - Pin the CA
(e.g. I use only “DigiNotar”!)
 - Pin the certificate
(e.g. I use only this specific certificate from ...)
- Insert new trust anchor (Usage 2/3)
 - Insert new CA
(e.g. I created my company CA and want to trust it)
 - Insert new EE
(e.g. what you would call self-signed certificate)

SELECTOR & MATCHING TYPE

- Selector
 - Fingerprint whole certificate
 - Fingerprint just the subjectPublicKeyInfo
(no need to change TLSA record when
changing the validity of cert, etc.)
- Matching Type (use hashing or not?)
 - Full certificate or SHA256 or SHA512

SECURITY OF DANE

- Depends on DNS
 - But you **already do!**

DANE AND DNSSEC

- Depends on DNSSEC and need secure path from resolver to end application
 - DNSSEC-Trigger - <http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/dnssec-trigger/>

GO AND PLAY

- Swede tool (<https://github.com/pieterlexis/swede>)

```
usage: swede create [-h] [--port PORT] [--protocol {tcp,udp,sctp}]  
                  [--certificate CERTIFICATE] [--output {generic,rfc,both}]  
                  [--usage {0,1,2,3}] [--selector {0,1}] [--mtype {0,1,2}]
```

```
# swede create -p 443 -o rfc -u 1 -s 1 -c www.nic.cz.pem -m 2 www.nic.cz  
_443._tcp.www.nic.cz. IN TLSA 1 1 2 b43dd88534c0a26859d19a26a54a50205518  
7de2099f6d35564c55a659525a52dcb5163c  
961e233578a3408d57e7c842db2234796705  
8c2396c88e7cd367a978
```


FUTURE OF DANE

- Other protocols with complex lookups (aka fix the protocols)
 - S/MIME – [draft-ietf-dane-smime](#)
 - SMTP – [draft-fanf-dane-smtp](#)
 - MUA – [draft-fanf-dane-mua](#)
 - XMPP – [draft-miller-xmpp-dnssec-proofype](#)
- Implementations
 - Firefox Add-On: DanePatrol (fork of Certificate Patrol)
 - Chicken & Egg problem – no users thus no consumers and vice versa

QUESTIONS?