
Dealing with fragmentation in EDNSO Proposal for a recommendation




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Sean McAfee (AP)



Problem recap





Extent of the problem

- 9% of all internet hosts may have problems receiving fragmented UDP messages [1];
- 2% 10% of all resolving name servers experience problems receiving fragmented DNS responses [2]

[1] Weaver, N., Kreibich, C., Nechaev, B., and Paxson, V.: Implications of Netalyzr's DNS Measurements. In: Proceedings of the First Workshop on Securing and Trusting Internet Names (SATIN), Teddington, United Kingdom, (2011).

[2] Van den Broek, J., Van Rijswijk, R., Pras, A., Sperotto, A., "DNSSEC and firewalls - Deployment problems and solutions", Private Communication, Pending Publication, (2012).





Solutions

 Resolving name servers should advertise a proper max. response size to avoid fragmentation issues [RFC 2671BIS (DRAFT)];


Not explicitly stated in standards yet, nor widely *implemented;*

 Until then: set maximum response size at some authoritative name servers



Resolver experiments (1) Normal operations

Response time (ms.)





BIND


381
105

687

L

Resolver experiments (2) Blocking fragments


Response time (ms.) [0/5 altered Authoritative Name Servers]





Resolver experiments (3) Max. resp. size on 1 authNS


Response time (ms.) [1/5 altered Authoritative Name Servers]







Resolver experiments (4) Max. resp. size on 2 authNS







Experiment on live authNS

Traffic (IPv4 + IPv6)	Normal Operations	M si
Fragmented responses	28.9%	
Fragment receiving resolvers	57.3%	
Truncated UDP responses	0.8%	
ICMP FRTE messages	5649/h	
ICMP FRTE sending resolvers	1.3%	
Total retries	25.8%	

*Statistically significant difference between experiments



25.5%

0.0%*

 $< 1/h^{*}$

0.9%

0.0%* 0.0%*

lax. response ze 1232 bytes

Rise in truncated answers


• Experiment:

- Querying 995 zones in .com, .edu, .mil, .net and .nl
- All zones are signed and have a www-node
- Results:

Max. response	A for www	AAAA for www
4096	0.0%	0.0%
1472	1.8%	1.8%
1232	2.9%	3.5%

- 30% truncations were expected for a maximum response size of 1232 bytes by Rikitake, K., Nogawa, H., Tanaka, T., Nakao, K. and Shimojo, S. "An Analysis of DNSSEC Transport Overhead Increase", IPSJ SIG Technical Reports 2005-CSEC-28, Vol. 2005, No. 33, pp. 345-350, ISSN 0919-6072, 2005







Proposed recommendation

- 1. At least 50% of all authoritative name servers for a zone SHOULD be set to limit the overall response size to 1472 bytes, but MAY be set as low as 1232 bytes;
- 2. At least 50% of all in-zone authoritative name servers for a zone SHOULD be set to limit the overall response size to 1472 bytes, but MAY be set as low as 1232 bytes;
- 3. Authoritative name servers to which the above recommendations are applied MUST accept DNS queries over TCP.






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Questions? Remarks?

